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Conflux Network

Project Description

What are the purposes, goals, or scope of the project? If there are metrics to measure success, what are they?
  • Conflux Network enables the secure and interoperable flow of assets and data to create an internet of value for all, the vision for the blockchain is to scale decentralized economies across borders and
  • Metrics to measure the success of the project can be broken up into 5
    • Ecosystem Development: # of infrastructure partnerships, # of wallets, # of exchange listings, market cap, 24hr volume, transaction count, total value of
    • Asset Acquisition: Number of protocol redeployments, TVL, # Stablecoins & volume, # of governance tokens +
    • Market Awareness: Media coverage, website metrics, user acquisition stats, content engagement (english & mandarin), # of events & type of participation
    • Developer Adoption:
      • Exposure: # of events, event type, and type of participation, educational content metrics (# and type of content produced)
      • Engagement: Number and type of developers, Github metrics (commits in the last year, lines added in past
      • Building: Number of repositories, language support
      • Deployment: # of deployed dApps
    • Community Building: Social followers, channel members (slack, telegram, discord, etc), Number of events hosted vs participated in, # of ambassadors
What, if any, are the coordinating entities, and what are their functions? (For example, a foundation, software development corporation, DAO, etc.)
  • Conflux Foundation: Responsible for overseeing early network operations and allocated budget effectively to support the growth of the
  • Technical Oversight Committee: Responsible for overseeing the technical capabilities of Conflux Network through supporting community developers, and allocating grants to support their
  • Global Office: Responsible for growing the Conflux market awareness, and communities overseas (outside of China).
  • Conflux DAO: Responsible for voting on key network issues. Any CFX token holder is allowed to vote on
How are participants and users of the project identified? (For example, by public/private cryptographic keypair, wallet number, government ID, etc.) Are there restrictions on who can participate? If so, how are they implemented?

Participants and users of the project are identified by holding CFX tokens in their wallet. I.e. positive CFX wallet balance (>0) and wallet ID. There are no restrictions on who can participate.

Stakeholder Groups

Does the project’s software code delineate groups with particular functions? (For example, those who can propose changes, arbitrate disputes, or vote tokens on behalf of others.)

No the project’s software code does not delineate groups with particular functions. However as a L1, DApps and smart contracts built on top of Conflux could make such delineations.

Are there other important groups either constituted informally, specified through contractual arrangements, or based on geography/choice of law?

As a public permissionless blockchain, there are many important groups and informally constituted within the larger Conflux ecosystem. The Foundation team hires and contracts employees whose role is partly to support groups of strategic importance.

For groups that are informally structured and organically form (such as a developer team that launched a DApp), Conflux has no power to restrict access to the network, but is free to not support, for example, by not promoting or allocating a grant to.

Goals and Implementation

What behaviors does the project seek to encourage, or discourage? How are such behaviors incentivized?

Conflux seeks to encourage meaningful contributions to the network and organic growth. Such behaviours are incentivised through a grant program, and through the general token economics of the project. As a public permissionless chain, Conflux is not able to directly discourage bad actors and detrimental contributions (such as hackers who steal funds), but indirectly through the token economics, whereby token holders as a whole are incentivized to encourage meaningful contributions to realize appreciation of their Conflux assets.

(For operational projects): How well are the incentives and governance mechanisms functioning in practice? Are there metrics to measure the effectiveness of governance?

Network governance is operational, but still quite early in its lifecycle. At time of writing, there have been 10 network votes that took place (9 completed). Metrics to measure the effectiveness of governance are the % of circulating supply that has participated in votes, and # of tokens locked to earn governance votes.

Are there systems to pay for infrastructure, protocol upgrades, development work, network enhancements and/or other work deemed to be in the interest of the network? If so, how do they operate?

The Conflux Grants program is the primary system in place to pay external parties for infrastructure, protocol upgrades, development work, and network enhancements. The foundation also has a token allocation and a budget that it allocated to hire personnel to carry out such work ‘in house’ as well.

Governance Powers

What makes a governance decision associated with this project legitimate or illegitimate?

What makes a governance decision associated with this project legitimate or illegitimate is whether The Foundation ratifies the policy outcome of a vote. However if the Foundation does not ratify a certain policy decided via vote that could put the foundation at risk of loosing its legitimate status.

Who has power to introduce governance proposals, and how does that process operate?

Anyone has the power to introduce governance proposals. Once a proposal is brought to a vote, any token holder is allowed to vote on proposals. Token holders earn voting power by staking their CFX in a specified smart contract that then allocates voting power to a user proportional to the quantity of CFX staked and how long it was staked for.

Who has policy-setting (“legislative") power to decide on proposals, and how does that process operate?

The community of CFX token holders who have staked CFX to ear voting power are able to decide on proposals.

Who has implementation (“executive”) power to execute proposals once decided upon, and how does that process operate?

The Foundation has the executive power to execute proposals once decided. This process occurs off chain, with verification that the policy was executed usually occurring on-chain. Example burning tokens, or unlocking investor tokens.

Who has interpretive (“judicial”) power to resolve disputes over application of a policy to a specific instance, and how does that process operate? What can the interpretive power be used to mandate?

The Foundation has the judicial power to resolve disputes over application of a policy, specifically management of the foundation. The interpretive power can be used to mandate policies regarding token supply (eg, burning or unlocking tokens), codebase updates, and integration support.

What checks and balances, or systems of accountability, exist among these governance powers?

There are no formal checks and balances in place in the sense that more formal governance structures have not had the time to emerge yet. Launching with very minimal governance (a simple forum + voting module), the expectation is that more formal structures will emerge as the community grows, becomes more organized, and demands greater input into network governance.

Governance Procedure

Governance Procedure

Are there systems for non-binding signals or binding votes on governance decisions? If so, please describe them in detail.

At this stage in Conflux’s network governance, systems are non-binding. The system consists of a forum where the community is free to propose and discuss topics. Once a proposal has received sufficient support (informally in the forum) it can be brought to a network vote. Once the vote is decided, it is up to the Foundation whether to enact the new policy or not. If they feel that the proposal represents a valid preference from the community and the vote was legitimate, then it is in their interest to enact the new policy, but it is non-binding.

Are there distinctions between decisions made by ordinary processes (for example, majority votes) and those which require extraordinary processes (for example, supermajority votes)? Or are there non-standard processes you would, or have, used in emergency situations? Explain as appropriate.

There are no distinctions at this point in time, but is expected to be implemented as the community grows and more formal governance processes emerge.

Are there aspects that can never be changed through governance processes, short of a contentious hard fork of the network? If so, how is that ensured?

There are no aspects that can never be changed through governance processes.

Are there mechanisms that make changing the project easier or harder?

Currently The Foundation is overseeing all major network projects (core protocol code base, asset bridge, grants program etc), so by design changes can be made quite quickly, as is needed in any startup. These changes are easy to enact for parties active in The Foundation, but difficult for community members who participate only via voting. Example, putting to a vote a major change to the protocol is not as easy as just submitting and voting on a proposal. A lot of community discussion in the forum, and off-chain in the ‘real-world’ is required to lobby for such a change.

What revisions to governance mechanisms have been made, or are under consideration, and why?

Considerations and plans are being developed to launch a Conflux DAO to formalize the governance process and voting mechanisms. The hope is to provide tools for more effective community input, organization, and governance. But since the Network is relatively early in its lifecycle, such formal structures are not required and in fact can be detrimental to the early-stage operations of the network.

Other Information